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Articles
ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AFTER
HUDSON v. MICHIGAN. PREVENTING AND
REMEDYING POLICE MISCONDUCT
ALICIA M. HILTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Supreme Court has rejected the exclusionary rule as the default
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In the landmark decision
of Hudson v. Michigan, the Court recognized that the exclusionary rule is a
flawed doctrine that should be applied only "where its deterrence benefits
outweigh its 'substantial social costs.""
The Supreme Court's limitation of the exclusionary rule is long over-
due. Rather than deterring police misconduct, as was the rule's intent,
the exclusionary rule, in fact, exerts tremendous pressure on law enforce-
ment officers to commit perjury and other illegal acts in order to secure
criminal convictions.2 In addition, the exclusionary rule offers no remedy
for innocent persons subjected to unlawful search or seizure.3
The Supreme Court's erosion of the exclusionary rule highlights the
need for an effective remedy and deterrent for knock-and-announce viola-
tions. Under the common law, unless there were special circumstances,
police officers could not forcibly enter a residence to execute a search
warrant without first knocking at the door, identifying themselves as of-
ficers of the law, articulating their reason for requesting admittance to the
home and being refused admittance by an occupant.4 In Wilson v. Arkan-
sas, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the "common-law 'knock
* Visiting Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law;J.D., 1997, The University of
Chicago Law School; B.A. in Sociology, 1988, The University of California at
Berkeley. Prior to practicing law, the author was an FBI Special Agent. As an FBI
Special Agent, the author was a member of a foreign counterintelligence squad
and also worked undercover in two long-term criminal cases, posing as a drug
dealer with ties to organized crime.
1. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob.
and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
2. See, e.g., Tom Barker & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering
Your Ass": Some Conceptual Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEVIANT BEHAv. 61, 69 (1990);
Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOL-
ocV 693 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About
It, 67 U. CoLo. L. REx,. 1037 (1996).
3. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484-86 (1976) (citing Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)); see also William Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment
Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 911 (1991).
4. See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b (K.B. 1604).
(47)
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and announce' principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment."5 The Hudson decision did not relieve law en-
forcement officers from the obligation to follow the knock-and-announce
rule, but it limited the force of the rule by holding that a failure to knock-
and-announce does not justify exclusion of the evidence obtained in the
search.
6
Although the majority opinion in Hudson offered civil litigation under
Section 1983, suits for common law torts and administrative sanctions as
sufficient alternative deterrents to police misconduct, these sanctions have
proved ineffectual in the past. A survey of civil actions arising from failure
to knock-and-announce cases demonstrates that Section 1983 and state
common law claims seldom provide any meaningful relief. Civil suits do
not provide a strong deterrent because the long delays of civil litigation
and the plaintiffs' frequent lack of success render any deterrent effect too
remote and too uncertain to be effective. Current administrative sanc-
tions are also an inadequate deterrent.
This article analyzes police motivations for violating the knock-and-
announce rule, considers why current remedies are ineffective and sug-
gests enhanced judicial and administrative remedies. First, the judiciary
should act to protect the public from rogue officers who disregard the
knock-and-announce rule. Prosecutors are under an existing ethical obli-
gation to report law enforcement misconduct to the courts, and careful
regard for these existing ethical obligations will bring violations of the
knock-and-announce rule committed in the execution of search warrants
to the attention of the courts.
Prosecutors should welcome the reporting obligation as a means of
solving an ethical dilemma. Under the Hudson decision, prosecutors are
permitted to use evidence acquired in the context of a knock-and-an-
nounce violation. Unless prosecutors report the offending police officers
to the court, they are arguably complicit in the misconduct, could perpet-
uate the injury to the person whose rights were violated and may en-
courage officers to commit future acts of misconduct.
Exercising their inherent power to supervise the proper execution of
courts' own writs, judges should punish offending officers and protect the
public by issuing orders that bar the offending officers from executing
future warrants issued by the court. Such disciplinary orders would serve
as a strong deterrent to police officers and could include opportunities for
rehabilitation through training or other remedial measures.
This article also recommends enhanced administrative measures that
enforcement agencies can utilize to encourage officers to respect the
Fourth Amendment and citizens' privacy rights. These measures, includ-
5. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
6. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2170 (holding that destruction of property may
violate Fourth Amendment even though evidence obtained is not subject to
suppression).
[Vol. 53: p. 47
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ing de-emphasizing arrest quota systems, utilizing stress management pro-
grams and implementing targeted training programs with the proactive
participation of internal affairs, will reduce police misconduct. Internal
affairs and professional responsibility units should act proactively as train-
ing resources instead of in a purely reactive investigatory role. The train-
ing methods recommended by this article would reinforce law
enforcement officers' ethical value systems and would motivate officers to
better respect suspects' constitutional rights. Additional administrative
sanctions would provide officers with stronger deterrents against
misconduct.
The exclusionary rule may have a legitimate role in cases where an
officer's misconduct is extreme and outrageous, but a violation of the
knock-and-announce rule will rarely rise to such level. Instead, the knock-
and-announce rule is best enforced by sanctions that directly address the
offending conduct and prevent its recurrence.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Some legal scholars have praised the exclusionary rule as an effective
deterrent that protects both the innocent and the guilty from overzealous
law enforcement officers.7 Indeed, the exclusionary rule may have some
positive impact. Studies indicate that it has at least raised law enforcement
officers' awareness of the Fourth Amendment, as evidenced by the higher
number of search warrants that officers have obtained since the Mapp de-
7. Scholars who have espoused support for the exclusionary rule in their writ-
ings include: Albert W. Alschuler, Close Enough for Government Work: The Exclusionary
Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. Ruv. 309 (1984); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 429 (1974); Donald A. Dripps, Be-
yond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 591, 622-24 (1990); William C.
Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1242-
43 (1989); Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26
HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 119 (2003); Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expedi-
ency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale And Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895
(1984); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1994); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Deregulating the Police
and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981); David A. Moran, The End of the
Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 2006 CATo Sup. CT. REv. 283 (2006); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule
Reconsidered: Restoring The Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 261 (1998);
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule As A
Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974); Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HAry. L. REv. 820, 847-52 (1994); Daniel B. Ye-
ager, From the 'Gatehouse' to the 'Mansion': Throwing Out Evidence in Criminal Cases,
CiuM L. BULL., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 118.
2008]
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cision. 8 However, the benefits of the rule are outweighed by the harsh toll
its application exacts upon society.9
Since Ohio v. Mapp established that the exclusionary rule is the pri-
mary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in state court proceedings,
the number of suppression motions filed has soared. 10 Not only has the
increased motion practice driven up court costs, thereby siphoning away
limited judicial and prosecutorial resources, it has also exacted other more
corrosive effects upon society.1"
If a defense attorney's suppression motion is successful, the exclusion-
ary rule may prevent the government from introducing at trial the only
reliable evidence of a defendant's guilt. This exclusion can enable the
guilty to escape punishment and can send dangerous criminals back to
harm other innocent citizens. 12 The percentage of successful suppression
motions varies depending upon the jurisdiction and the type and severity
of the crime. 13 For instance, in an empirical study of state felony cases in
various jurisdictions, sponsored by the Law Enforcement Alliance of
America, researchers found that "due process related reasons accounted
for only a small portion of the rejections at [prosecutor] screening-from
1 to 9 percent."14 Given, however, the fact that in some states recidivism
rates are higher than 60% for individuals who have been convicted of
committing felonies, that statistic is frightening.' 5 Proponents of the ex-
clusionary rule assert that because the percentage of defendants who suc-
cessfully argue suppression motions is small, the negative impact upon
society is also small. This logic is flawed.
Many ... researchers have concluded that the impact of the ex-
clusionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with
which they deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are
released because the cases against them were based in part on
illegal searches or seizures. 16
8. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond The Exclusion-
ary Rule, 83 IowA L. REv. 669, 710-11 (1998) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871
(1960)).
9. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163, 2165-66 (citing United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984)) (comparing costs and benefits of applying exclusionary rule to all
knock-and-announce violations).
10. See Perrin et al., supra note 8, at 710-11; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
11. See id.
12. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2163 (discussing substantial social costs of exclu-
sionary rule).
13. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6 (citing Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What
We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study And Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611, 621 (1983)).
14. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 28-29 (2004) (citing Kathleen Brosi, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, A Cross-City
Comparison of Felony Case Processing 18-20 (1979)).
15. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2200 (2006).
16. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 n.6 (1984).
[Vol. 53: p. 47
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A study by Raymond A. Atkins and Paul H. Rubin estimated that the exclu-
sionary rule has "increased crimes of larceny by 3.9 percent, auto theft by
4.4 percent, burglary by 6.3 percent, robbery by 7.7 percent, and assault by
18 percent."17 Furthermore, the adverse impact of the exclusionary rule
on crime rates in suburban cities is even more alarming. In suburban cit-
ies, "the imposition of the exclusionary rule increased violent crimes by 27
percent and property crimes by 20 percent."18
Not only does the exclusionary rule frustrate the public's substantial
interest in keeping dangerous criminals behind bars, it causes other direct
and indirect harms upon society. The threat of the exclusionary rule can
prompt law enforcement officers to engage in misconduct, particularly
perjury.1 9 In a suppression hearing, officers face much greater pressure to
lie than in the context of a warrant application. 20 When officers applied
for a warrant, they may have had only probable cause that the suspect was
guilty. But at the suppression hearing, the officers have evidence suffi-
cient to take the case to trial. Convinced of the defendant's guilt, the
officers may perjure themselves to ensure that the jury hears all the rele-
vant evidence and reaches the verdict the defendant actually deserves. 21
When officers commit perjury, they are wronging themselves, wrong-
ing the defendant and cheating society. Scholars who follow the slippery-
slope model of police corruption assert that once officers commit a cor-
rupt act, they are more likely to commit other corrupt acts in the future.22
It is also possible that the corrupt acts will escalate. For instance, the of-
ficer's first act of corruption may be lying to cover up another officer's
failure to knock-and-announce. A future act of corruption could entail
"stiffing in a call," telephoning in a phony anonymous tip to gain the prob-
able cause necessary to apply for a search warrant.23
When police perjury is discovered, it damages the public's trust in
government.2 4 "[T] he revelation that some police routinely and casually
lie under oath makes members of the public, including those who serve on
juries, less willing to believe all police, truthful or not."25 Witnesses and
17. Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime
Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46J.L. & EcoN. 157, 174
(2003).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 69; Dripps, supra note 2, at 696-
97; Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1040.
20. See Stuntz, supra note 3, at 915, n.75 (citing H. RICHRDo UVILLER, TEM-
PERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAw PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW
YORK CI'Y POLICE ch. 12 (Contemporary Books 1988)).
21. See Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 67-69; Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1044.
22. See MICHAEL A. CALDERO & JOHN P. CRANK, POLICE ETHICS: THE CORRUP-
TION OF NOBLE CAUSE 104-05, 113-14 (Anderson 2d ed. 2004).
23. See id. at 114.
24. See SAM S. SOURYAL, ETHICS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IN SEARCH OF THE TRUTH
346 (Anderson 3d ed. 2003) (describing how police corruption undermines public
faith); Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1039.
25. Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1039.
2008]
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crime victims who distrust police are less likely to report criminal activity
and cooperate with police investigations. 26 The public's perception that
police lie can become so pervasive that prosecutors feel compelled to
make defensive comments about law enforcement officers before they tes-
tify to reassure jurors that the officer is telling the truth.2 7 Some jurors
and members of the public may suspect that prosecutors and even the
judge are complicit in the officer's lies. 28 The problem of police perjury
and the corrosive effect it has on the justice system is addressed further in
Part XI of this article.
Perjury is not the only form of police misconduct encouraged by the
exclusionary rule. In addition to resorting to "fluffing up the evidence"
against suspects and committing perjury, some officers become so frus-
trated with the system that they resort to exacting extralegal punishments,
such as harassing or committing violent acts against suspects. 29 "The ex-
clusionary rule . . .has driven the police to methods less desirable than
those for which the judges shut truth from the jury's ears."30 In short, the
exclusionary rule fosters a regime where the guilty go free, the police re-
sort to extralegal means to secure convictions and the public loses respect
for the criminal justice system.
These harms could perhaps be justified if the exclusionary rule pro-
vided an effective remedy for the victims of police misconduct. The exclu-
sionary rule, however, does not even acknowledge the injuries done to an
innocent victim of an unreasonable search or seizure. "Post-Mapp deci-
sions have established that the [exclusionary] rule is not a personal consti-
tutional right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the
victim of the search or seizure, for any '[r]eparation comes too late.' '3 1
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has recognized that the exclusionary
rule is a flawed curative measure that does indeed carry substantial social
costs. 32 The Court has "repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll'
upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obsta-
cle for those urging [its] application."3 3 Because of this high toll, the
26. See SOURYAL, supra note 24, at 333-34.
27. See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1039; Joseph Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty
of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B3.
28. See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1039; Sexton, supra note 27, at B3.
29. See Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 69; Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects
of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 40 (1978).
30. Id.; Quick, supra note 29, at 40 (citing Monrad G. Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52J. CRIM. L., C & P.S. 255, 257 (1961)).
31. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 637 (1965)); see also Stuntz, supra note 3, at 911 (stating that exclusionary
rule only protects guilty criminals).
32. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2166 (2006) (citing United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).
33. See id. at 2163 (citing Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357,
364-65 (1998) (changes in original).
[Vol. 53: p. 47
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Court has held the rule to be applicable only "where its remedial objec-
tives are thought most efficaciously served." 34
The debate on the applicability of the exclusionary rule in failure to
knock-and-announce situations is particularly timely given the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Hudson v. Michigan. The next section of this
article surveys the evolution of the knock-and-announce rule and the pub-
lic policy arguments that the Supreme Court considered in Hudson.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
The requirement that law enforcement officers must knock and an-
nounce their presence before entering a residence is not a new rule.
Under the common law, unless there were special circumstances, police
officers could not forcibly enter a residence to execute a search warrant
without first knocking at the door, identifying themselves as officers of the
law, articulating their reason for requesting admittance into the home and
being refused admittance by an occupant.3 5 Statutes in the majority of
U.S. states address the issue of whether law enforcement officers are re-
quired to knock-and-announce when executing a warrant.3 6 The federal
statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109, provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to exe-
cute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and pur-
pose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate
himself or a person aiding him in the execution of a warrant. 37
The common law is consistent with the high value the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment placed on the sanctity of the home. 38 In the 1995
Supreme Court case Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court unanimously held that
the common law knock-and-announce principle "forms a part of the rea-
sonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment."39 Therefore, "the
reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part on whether
law enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to
entering."4 0
34. Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
35. See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b (KB. 1604); see also Hudson, 126
S. Ct. at 2162 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-32 (1995)).
36. See Craig Hemmens & Chris Mathias, United States v. Banks: The "Knock-
and-Announce" Rule Returns To The Supreme Court, 41 IDAHO L. REv. 1, 12 (2004); see
also FRANK W. MILLER, ROBERT 0. DAWSON, GEORGE E. Dix & RAYMOND I. PARNAS,
THE POLICE FUNCTION 31 (Foundation 6th ed. 2000).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988).
38. See PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 240 (Carolina Academic Press 2005).
39. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929.
40. Id. at 931.
2008]
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Proponents of the knock-and-announce rule assert that (1) it protects
life and limb because a frightened resident may mistake an unannounced
police entry for a criminal invasion and brandish a weapon or take other
defensive measures; (2) it protects property by giving the occupant the
opportunity to admit the officers; and (3) it protects privacy and preserves
dignity by reducing the risk that the police will enter the wrong resi-
dence. 41 Even when there is no mistake about the place to be searched, it
permits those within to have brief notice to prepare for the police entry.42
For example, if officers knock-and-announce their presence, a sleeping
resident might have time to don a robe before officers enter his bedroom.
Even when the entry is made without force, as when the residence
door is not locked or an apartment manager agrees to open the door, the
police must ordinarily observe the requirement to knock-and-announce
before entering. 43 Even if the residence door is wide open, some courts
require that police must first announce their presence before entering.44
To comply with the notice requirements under the knock-and-announce
rule, the officers must identify themselves as police and indicate that they
are at the home to execute a search warrant.45 After this announcement is
made, they must wait a reasonable time for an occupant of the premises to
admit them. If they are denied entry or there is no response from within
the residence, the officers may proceed with a forcible entry if necessary. 46
The Supreme Court first addressed how much delay is necessary
before forcible entry in United States v. Banks.47 In this 2003 decision, the
Court instructed that in a situation where there is "no reason to suspect an
immediate risk of frustration or futility in waiting at all," an occupant must
be given enough time to answer the door.48 If, however, the officers have
a reasonable suspicion that there is a risk of destruction of evidence, the
test is how much time the occupant needs to destroy evidence. 49 In Banks,
the Court concluded unanimously that the fifteen to twenty second wait by
the police before they forced the door open with a battering ram was suffi-
cient because the police had reason to believe that if they waited longer,
Banks would destroy his suspected stash of cocaine. The officers that exe-
cuted the search were unaware that Banks was showering when they
41. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006); see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCYJ. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 167 (Thompson
4th ed. 2004).
42. See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 167.
43. See, e.g., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968); Keiningham v.
United States, 287 F.2d 126, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1960); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
41, at 167.
44. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 167.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 43 (2003).
47. See id. at 34-35.
48. Id. at 41.
49. See id. at 40.
[Vol. 53: p. 47
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knocked on the door. The Court reasoned, "the facts known to the police
are what count in judging reasonable waiting time."'50
In addition to destruction of evidence, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized other situations where police do not have to knock-and-announce: a
reasonable suspicion of a threat of physical violence to the officers or
someone within the residence, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing would be futile or a hot pursuit of a fleeing criminal. 5 1 With
regard to futility, proof that the officers have made a demand for entry
and that entry has been refused has been deemed unnecessary. 52 For in-
stance, if a uniformed officer is seen by an occupant of a residence before
the officer announces his presence and the occupant proceeds to slam an
open door in the officer's face, it would be a senseless ceremony for the
officer to have to knock on the door and demand admittance. Reasonable
suspicion, rather than probable cause, is the appropriate showing when a
no-knock entry is challenged. 53 The reasonable suspicion standard strikes
the proper balance between respecting individual privacy interests and ad-
dressing legitimate law enforcement concerns in the execution of search
warrants.
54
The Supreme Court has rejected a bright-line rule that certain catego-
ries of cases, such as felony narcotics investigations, should always be ex-
empt from knock-and-announce. 55 Instead, the Court requires a case-by-
case, totality of the circumstances analysis.5 6 Furthermore, "a magistrate's
decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to
remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concern-
ing the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being exe-
cuted."57 In situations where law enforcement officers did not follow the
knock-and-announce rule and later failed to show the required reasonable
suspicion of exigent circumstances, state courts have not uniformly ex-
cluded evidence, even if the jurisdiction has a knock-and-announce stat-
ute. Until Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court had not decided
whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for an improper
no-knock entry.
IV. HUDSON V. MICHIGAN
In the June 15, 2006 decision for Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme
Court considered whether narcotics and firearms seized during a search
50. Id. at 39.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); Richards v. Wiscon-
sin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
52. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)
53. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394-95.
54. See id. at 394.
55. See id. at 395; see also United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir.
2000).
56. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
57. Id. at 396 n.7.
2008]
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should be suppressed because the police officers who executed the war-
rant failed to follow the knock-and-announce rule. Although the Detroit
police officers who executed the warrant announced their presence, they
waited only a short time, perhaps three to five seconds, before opening the
unlocked front door and entering Booker Hudson's home.58 Because
Michigan conceded that the officers had violated the requirement to
knock-and-announce, the sole issue was whether to apply the exclusionary
rule.59 Although there were firearms found in Hudson's residence, in-
cluding a loaded gun found between the chair cushion and armrest where
Booker Hudson had been sitting when the officers entered, during Michi-
gan court proceedings, the prosecutor conceded that the danger-to-of-
ficers exception to the knock-and-announce requirement did not apply in
this particular case. 60
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that
violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require application of
the exclusionary rule. Exclusion of evidence was not warranted because
"the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for
cause of obtaining the evidence." 6 1 The police would have executed the
warrant and found the guns and cocaine even without the knock-and-an-
nounce violation. 62 Furthermore, even if the violation was the but-for
cause of the seizure, it would not necessarily be a sufficient condition for
suppression. 63 The Court noted, "we have 'never held that evidence is
"fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because "it would not have come to
light but for the illegal actions of the police." 64 The Court emphasized
that, "Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objec-
tion is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' ,65
The officers who executed the search of Hudson's residence did have
a search warrant and the knock-and-announce rule has never protected
"one's interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evi-
dence described in a warrant."66 "Since the interests that were violated in
this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable." 67 In addition, the exclusionary rule is not an
appropriate remedy for a knock-and-announce violation because its deter-
58. Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006).
59. See id. at 2163.
60. See id. at 2162.
61. Id. at 2164.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 2164 (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984)).
65. Id. (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
66. Id. at 2165.
67. Id.
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rence benefits would not outweigh its "substantial social costs." 6 8 If Hud-
son had prevailed, other criminal defendants would flood the courts with
complaints that their rights similarly had been violated.6 9 The courts
would be burdened with judging the merits of this endless stream of sup-
pression motions, many of which would be groundless, and dangerous
criminals would inevitably be set free. 70 In addition, a victory for Hudson
would also have meant increased risks for law enforcement officers. 7 1
Fearing baseless claims of misconduct, officers might endanger themselves
by waiting too long to enter after announcing their presence. 72
The Court reasoned that the threat of internal police discipline and
the threat of civil suits were effective motivators to prompt officers to fol-
low the knock-and-announce rule.73 This is especially so because "[t]he
number of public-interest law firms and lawyers who specialize in civil-
rights grievances has greatly expanded .... [T]he lower courts are al-
lowing colorable knock-and-announce suits to go forward, unimpeded by
assertions of qualified immunity."74 The Supreme Court further reasoned
that police forces are now more professional, have improved the supervi-
sion and training of officers and have improved internal discipline pro-
grams that punish officers who commit misconduct.75 Police departments
are taking the constitutional rights of citizens seriously. 76
The Supreme Court was correct in asserting that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to violations of the knock-and-announce rule. Un-
fortunately, however, current alternative remedies do not adequately pre-
vent or punish police misconduct. As the next two sections of this article
shall demonstrate, police officers almost always escape liability for plain-
tiffs' injuries, even when those officers search the wrong residence, find no
evidence of criminal activity and cause physical harm to residents.
V. PIAINTIFFS' CURRENT POTENTIAL CIVIL REMEDIES
A. The Federal Civil Rights Act
After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 1983, to provide Americans with a remedy for unlawful ar-
68. See id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
69. See id. at 2165-66.
70. Id. at 2162.
71. See id. at 2166 (discussing how delayed entrance may increase preventable
violence).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 2167-68.
74. Id. at 2167.
75. See id. at 2168.
76. Id.
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rests, detentions or killings committed by police. 77 Section 1983 was origi-
nally written to protect citizens from racist groups like the Ku Klux Klan. 78
Unlike plaintiffs in other types of causes of action whose attorneys
sometimes demand a retainer before they begin work, plaintiffs with low
incomes are not barred from seeking legal redress for civil rights viola-
tions. 79 Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), Congress has authorized attor-
ney's fees for civil rights plaintiffs. Civil rights plaintiffs may not benefit
from this provision, however, because most plaintiffs in these cases do not
prevail, recovery of attorney's fees is by no means certain and there are
other forms of litigation that are more attractive to a plaintiffs' lawyer.8 0
In order for a plaintiff to state a claim under Section 1983, the plain-
tiff must meet two requirements. First, the plaintiff must allege the viola-
tion of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 8'
Second, the plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was commit-
ted by a person who was acting under color of state law.8 2 The threshold
for meeting the color of law requirement is low. For example, even if an
officer is acting in a harassing or abusive manner, if he is acting in his
capacity as an officer, he will be found to be acting under color of law.83
It is clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law.
Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are
plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform
their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of
their authority or overstep it.8 4
Therefore, if an officer tortures a suspect to extract a confession, the of-
ficer is acting under color of law. Section 1983 causes of action are filed in
federal court. The plaintiff does not have to exhaust state court or admin-
istrative remedies before the Section 1983 suit or suits are filed.85 Further-
more, if the plaintiff prevails, under the Attorney's Fee Act of 1976, he can
recover attorney's fees.8 6
77. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Smith
v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987)).
78. See CRANK & CALDERO, supra note 22, at 145.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
80. See Don B. Kates & J. Anthony Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 136-37, 151 (1972).
81. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 558-59 (1989); West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
82. See West, 487 U.S. at 48.
83. See, e.g., Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting West,
487 U.S. at 49-50).
84. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).
85. See, e.g., Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
86. See Robert J. Meadows, Legal Issues in Policing, in VIsIONS FOR CHANGE:
CRIME ANDJUSTICE IN THE TwENTY-FIRsT CENTURY 105 (Rosyln Muraskin & Albert R.
Roberts eds., 1996).
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Section 1983 provides for equitable relief and money damages for the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion.87 The deterrent effect of such remedies, however, is questionable
because most police officers lack sufficient assets to pay any substantial
judgment.8 8 If the individual officer defendant is judgment-proof, the
plaintiff is not adequately compensated even if the plaintiff achieves a vic-
tory in court. Furthermore, although a plaintiff in a Section 1983 suit
does not have to prove that the officer had a specific intent to deprive him
of a federal right, the officer can raise the defense that he acted with prob-
able cause or in good faith.8 9 Thus, while municipality liability under Sec-
tion 1983 may provide a judgment against a deep pocket, such claims
present substantial hurdles, as discussed below in section 7.9o
Plaintiffs asserting Section 1983 claims arising from knock-and-an-
nounce violations have advanced many different theories of liability. The
litigation survey discussed below at Part VII includes at least six different
claims, all arising from the failure to knock and announce.9 1
1. Danger Creation Doctrine
Where action on the part of the police places plaintiffs in danger,
they can recover even if they were never in police custody.92 For example,
in the middle of the night, the police force a man to wait alone outside his
home while it is being searched. He is robbed and beaten by a passerby.
The police may be liable for his injuries.
2. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Bodily Privacy
Police may violate the right to bodily privacy when they cause a plain-
tiffs unclothed body to be seen by strangers. 93 For example, if a partially
unclothed woman is forced to wait in the lobby while her apartment is
searched and a neighbor sees her, she may be able to assert a claim for
violation of her right to bodily privacy.
3. Section 1983 Liability for the Acts of Others
An officer can be held liable for other officers' acts even without act-
ing in a supervisory role. Officers subject citizens to the deprivation of a
constitutional right within the meaning of Section 1983 if they perform an
87. See Quick, supra note 29, at 34.
88. See id. at 40.
89. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
90. For a further discussion of municipality liability, see infra notes 105-16 and
accompanying text.
91. Due to the extensive array of causes of action that can be brought by
plaintiffs, the list in Part V should be treated as an introduction, not a complete
summary of all available remedies.
92. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Seattle, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1091, 1095-96 (W.D.
Wash. 2005).
93. See, e.g., Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1118-19 (4th Cir. 1981).
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affirmative act, participate in someone else's affirmative act or omit to per-
form an act that officers are legally required to perform, and that derelic-
tion of duty causes the deprivation of plaintiffs' rights. 9 4 An officer does
not have to participate personally in the act to be held liable. 95 If an of-
ficer sets in motion a series of acts by others which the officer knew or
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the constitu-
tional injury, the officer can be held liable. 96
4. Conspiracy Liability
If a law enforcement officer joins in a plan with one or more other
officers or supervisors, and that plan results in a deprivation of constitu-
tional rights, the officer may be held liable as a coconspirator under Sec-
tion 1983:97
Each conspirator need not have known all of the details of the
illegal plan or all of the participants involved. All that must be
shown is that there was a single plan, that the alleged cocon-
spirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and that
an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that
caused injury to the complainant. 98
Although a plaintiff may introduce circumstantial evidence to provide
proof of conspiracy, vague allegations unsupported by material facts will
not be sufficient to state a claim under Section 1983. 99
5. Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Others
If an officer was in a position to prevent constitutional injuries that
were inflicted by another officer and that first officer failed to take action
to prevent those injuries, the first officer may be held liable under Section
1983. In order for liability to attach, four requirements must be met: (1)
the officer had a duty; (2) the officer failed to perform the duty; (3) a
relationship between the failure to perform and the original duty exists;
and (4) damage or injury resulted. 0 0
94. See, e.g., Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978); Crowe v.
County of San Diego, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2004); see also Diane M.
Allen, Annotation, Liability of supervisoy officials and government entities for having
failed to adequately train, supervise, or control individual peace officers who violate plain-
tiffs civil rights under 42 U.S.CA. § 1983, 70 A.L.R. 17 § 2(a) (1984).
95. See, e.g., Crowe, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-92 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at
743).
96. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743; Crowe, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
97. See Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985).
98. Id. at 944.
99. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
100. See Meadows, supra note 86, at 106.
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6. Injunction Against the Offending Officer
In addition to seeking money damages from the officer, the plaintiff
can also seek injunctive relief under Section 1983.101 Although this rem-
edy could be granted to end a pattern of specific abuses, and in that sense
would be a deterrent, the injunction would be powerless to deter many of
the potential non-recurring constitutional infringements. 10 2 "If a deliber-
ate pattern is not present or the identity of a party is unknown, the judge
has no grounds to order an injunction since there is no one or nothing to
enjoin."1 03
For instance, if the plaintiff was repeatedly being harassed by a police
officer, injunctive relief might be granted. On the other hand, if an anon-
ymous officer beats the plaintiff while the plaintiff is at home, and the
officer leaves and is never identified, the plaintiff would not be able to
attain injunctive relief against that officer. Furthermore, some courts have
required a plaintiff to have "clean hands" to obtain equitable relief, a diffi-
cult requirement for the plaintiff to attain in criminal cases. Some courts
also have required a plaintiff to seek a legal remedy before requesting an
injunction against the officer who allegedly poses a threat of future inju-
ries. 10 4 In addition, even if the court determines that the plaintiff is other-
wise entitled to injunctive relief, the court may be unable to draft an
effective injunctive order that does not unduly restrict essential law en-
forcement activities.' 0 5 In sum, courts rarely grant injunctive relief against
police misconduct, even when the alleged misconduct is part of a pattern
of abuse or unconstitutional policies. 10 6
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971) (stating that every person who causes any
citizen deprivation of any rights "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress").
102. See, e.g., Lankford, 364 F.2d 197, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1066) (granting injunc-
tive relief to plaintiffs for pattern of police misconduct); see also Myriam E. Gilles,
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. Rv. 1384, 1399-1404 (2000); Kates & Kouba, supra note
80, at 136-37. But see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 120-21 (1983)
(overturning preliminary injunction enjoining Los Angeles Police Department
from using chokehold). The Supreme Court reasoned that neither Lyons's previ-
ous exposure to the chokehold nor the department's continued policy to author-
ize use constituted a sufficient threat of future harm to confer equitable standing
to Lyons. See id. at 105-08; see also Gilles, supr, Kates & Kouba, supra note 80, at
136-37.
103. Quick, supra note 29, at 41.
104. See id. at 42-43 (citing Siedel, Injunctive Relief for Police Misconduct in the
United States, 50J. URBAN L. 681, 686 (1973)).
105. See id. at 43.
106. See Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y Ruv. 149, 159-60
(1998-1999) (citing Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an
Effective Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1455,
1513 (1993)).
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7. Municipality Liability
Suits against a law enforcement officer's employer are no longer
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10 7 After the Supreme
Court's decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, the Federal Torts
Claims Act was amended to permit suits against the federal government
for misconduct committed by federal law enforcement officers.' 08 Since
the 1978 holding in the Supreme Court case Monell v. Department of Social
Services of New York, citizens have also been able to reach into the pockets
of municipalities through Section 1983 actions.' 0 9 In 1989, however, the
Supreme Court held that citizens could not sue states or state officials act-
ing in their official capacities under Section 1983 because the states have
preserved their immunity by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.1 10
To state a claim for Section 1983 municipality liability, the plaintiff
must prove that a custom or official policy of the municipality caused the
plaintiff's constitutional injuryi'1 A municipality will not be held liable
simply because the officer was acting under color of law, or within the
scope of the duties of her office:
Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature
caused a constitutional tort . . . a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor,-or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory. 12
Municipality liability under Section 1983 "is limited to action for which the
municipality is actually responsible."' 13
Despite the plaintiffs hurdles in meeting the burden of proof, if an
occupant of a residence is injured or killed as a result of a knock-and-
announce violation, and Section 1983 claims are brought against the par-
ticipating officers and the municipality that employed them, the plaintiff is
107. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF PO-
LICE INVESTIGATION LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS
555 (LexisNexis 2002).
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006).
109. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
110. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 71 (1989).
111. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94; see also Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237
F.3d 567, 578-79 (5th Cir. 2001); Doe v. City of Waterbury, 453 F. Supp. 2d 537,
542 (D. Conn. 2006).
112. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see, e.g., Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (5th
Cir. 1996) (holding that County sheriff's rape of suspect in murder investigation
constituted county policy sufficient to impose municipality liability). But see Kohler
v. City of Wapokoneta, 381 F. Supp. 2d 692, 712 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (holding munic-
ipality was not liable for final policymaker's unauthorized, personal acts not taken
in course of any official function).
113. Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills, Nos. 4:00-CV-438-Y, 4:01-CV-
1008-Y, 2007 WL 750474, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2007).
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more likely to recover from the municipality than the individual officers.
Municipalities have deeper pockets and are more attractive targets of suits.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's holding in Owen v. Independence has
limited municipalities' ability to exercise good faith as a defense. 1 14
Courts have not, however, universally held that the federal government
cannot assert a good faith defense. In Norton v. Turner, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because the Federal Torts Claims Act was intended only to
be a supplement to claims under Bivens, the federal government is not
barred from asserting good faith as a defense.' 15
Theories of Section 1983 municipal liability include that the violation
was consistent with municipal policy, custom or practice.1 16 Even if the
violation was a new practice, if the police chief, sheriff or other supervisor
directed the action that produced the violation, the municipality will be
held liable. Municipalities can also be held liable for Section 1983 viola-
tions for failure to train, control or discipline their officers. 1 7 These fail-
ures have been interpreted as deliberate indifference to the citizens' need
for safety.
B. State Law Intentional Torts
In addition to Section 1983 claims, plaintiffs may also seek redress
through state law intentional tort causes of action. 118 "Intentional torts
refer to a wanton disregard for a person's rights."119 These include, but
are not limited to, assault, battery, trespass, false imprisonment, false ar-
rest, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breaking and
entering.12
0
VI. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Though criminal prosecutions are rare, officers who violate federal or
state laws may face criminal liability. The charges that can be brought
against an officer vary depending upon whether the officer is an employee
of the federal or the state government, and whether the law that was alleg-
edly violated was a federal or a state law.12 1 Federal officers can be
charged with maliciously and without probable cause securing a search
114. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980); see also
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
115. See Norton v. Turner, 581 F.2d 390, 395-97 (4th Cir. 1978).
116. SeeJohnson v. City of Aiken, No. 98-2611, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3628, at
*12 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2000).
117. See Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 1032.
118. See Molina v. Spanos, No. 98-4119, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22370, at *26
(10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1192 (2000); see also Hall v. Lopez,
823 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Colo. 1993).
119. CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 146.
120. See Quick, supra note 29, at 34.
121. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 107, at 553-54.
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warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2235; exceeding authority granted in a search
warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2234; and conducting a warrantless search not
incident to arrest or consent under 18 U.S.C. § 2236. The federal officers
can also be charged with conspiracy to violate constitutional rights under
18 U.S.C. § 241.122 State officers who, under color of state law, deprive a
person of constitutional rights can be charged under 18 U.S.C. § 242. In
addition, most jurisdictions provide criminal sanctions for false arrest and
trespass. Both state and federal officers can also be prosecuted for mur-
der. 123 A successful criminal prosecution, of course, requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the officer's guilt. 1 24
Although the currently available remedies for knock-and-announce
violations seem numerous, they do not adequately address plaintiffs' inju-
ries. It is often difficult to quantify the harm caused by an illegal
search. 125 Furthermore, Section 1983 and common law tort remedies are
too remote and uncertain to address plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiff must
find a competent attorney who is willing to undertake protracted litiga-
tion, and the plaintiff, as indicated by this author's survey of cases, usually
fails to win any material monetary remedy. Thus, the victim receives no
meaningful remedy and the offending officer faces no substantial sanction
to deter future misconduct. In addition, criminal sanctions do nothing to
compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, and the majority of officers who
commit knock-and-announce violations, even when the violations were
committed in bad faith, suffer no criminal sanctions. Also disturbing are
the statistics about internal departmental actions, or lack thereof, taken
against officers who allegedly committed misconduct. One study reported
that officers who are sued are more than twice as likely to get promoted as
to be punished. 12 6 The next section of this article provides a concise over-
view of knock-and-announce cases and discusses factors that affected a
plaintiffs ability to recover for his or her injuries through the courts.
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook & Mike Morris, More Atlanta Cops Suspended in Fa-
tal No-Knock Raid, THE ATLANTAJOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 28, 2007, at B1; Beth
Warren, Kathryn Johnston Shooting. Informant hiding out, plans to sue police, city, THE
ATLANTAJOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 28, 2007, at B1. A botched no-knock drug
raid resulted in an elderly woman being shot to death by Atlanta police officers.
See id. Two of the officers pled guilty to criminal charges, including voluntary man-
slaughter, violation of oath by a public officer, giving of false statement, criminal
solicitation and perjury. Id. A third officer was indicted on state charges of false
statements, violation of oath of office by a public officers and false imprisonment.
Id. As of June 28, 2007, he is still contesting those charges. See Cook & Morris,
supra. On June 28, 2007, three more Atlanta police officers who were involved in
the raid were suspended with pay pending the outcome of a federal investigation.
Id. The drug informant involved in the scandal plans to sue the police department
and the city. Id.
124. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 107, at 554.
125. See Stuntz, supra note 3, at 910-18.
126. See CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 146.
[Vol. 53: p. 47
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss1/2
20081 ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
VII. SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE CASES
Only rarely do victims of knock-and-announce violations sue law en-
forcement officers or their municipal employers, and only rarely do those
victims who do sue in this context recover any meaningful relief.127 In this
author's survey of knock-and-announce civil suits, more than fifty cases
were examined. 128 The earliest case examined was decided on appeal in
1973.129 The two most recent cases examined were heard by courts in
2007, and six cases were examined that were heard by courts in 2006.130
The survey of cases revealed that plaintiffs who received physical injuries
or who had relatives who were killed by police were more likely to recover
damages than plaintiffs who suffered no physical harm. Of the plaintiffs
who did recover, if there was a physical injury or a death the amount of
the total recovery tended to be larger. Nevertheless, most of the plaintiffs
who experienced physical injuries did not prevail in their suits against in-
dividual law enforcement officers or the municipalities that employed the
officers.
The research also revealed a correlation between whether the search
uncovered evidence of criminal activity and the plaintiffs likelihood of
success. Regardless of the conduct of the offending officers, juries find it
difficult to sympathize with a plaintiff who has committed crimes, particu-
larly when the crimes are serious. 1 31 If no evidence of criminal activity was
127. See Moran, supra note 7, at 301 (citing Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct.
2159, 2167 (2006)).
128. In order to identify knock-and-announce cases to include in the survey,
the all cases database, the all text and periodicals database, and the jury verdict
and settlement reporters on Lexis and Westlaw were searched. Online news
sources were also searched.
129. See Rodriguez v. Jones 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1973). Dallas County Sher-
iffs and Dallas Police Department officers, in ajoint operation, executed an arrest
warrant for two individuals who were suspected of murdering three deputy sheriffs.
Id. The plaintiffs, Tomas Rodriguez and his family, alleged that the deputy sheriffs
and police officers failed to properly knock and announce their presence and then
wait a reasonable amount of time before entering the apartment. Id. The suspects
were not at the apartment, but gunfire was exchanged between the deputy sheriffs
and Tomas Rodriguez; Rodriguez and his wife were shot and wounded. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that though the law
enforcement officers were mistaken in their belief that the murder suspects were
at the apartment, the officers had acted reasonably. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs
were not entitled to recover under Section 1983. Id.
130. See Harman v. Pollock, 446 F.3d 1069 (10th Cir. 2006); Trujillo v. Large,
165 Fed. Appx. 619 (10th Cir. 2006); Estate of Davis v. City of N. Richland Hills,
Nos. C1V.A.4:00-CV-438-Y, 4:01-CV-1008-Y, 2007 WL 750474 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13,
2007); Closure v. Onondaga County, No. 5:06-CV-926 (NPM/GJD), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8947 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2007); Kniffen v. Macomb County, No. 04-70497,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90839 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2006); Tolliver v. Baxter County,
No. 05-3036 (W.D. Ark. filed July 18, 2006); Hernandez v. Conde, 442 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2006); Cassady v, Yellowstone County Mont. Sheriff Dep't, 2006 MT
217 (Mont. Sep. 6, 2006).
131. See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
111, 115 (2002); Tracey Maclin, Wen the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than
19
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found, the plaintiff was more likely to receive a favorable result at trial or
in a settlement; however not all of these innocent plaintiffs were granted
relief.
Even when the jurisdiction had a statute that required notice be given
before the search, such as a codified knock-and-announce rule, these stat-
utes did not necessarily aid plaintiffs. 13 2 In the more than fifty cases re-
viewed, courts almost always granted summary judgment for the officers,
or the municipalities, or both, based on findings of qualified immunity.
An additional eight cases were identified through jury verdict or settle-
ment reports. The amount of total recovery in each of these cases ranged
from $169,000 in Ajamu v. City of Orlando,133 to $3,500,000 in Heard v.
Board of County Commissioners.13 4
In Ajamu, three police officers had a warrant to search a unit in the
same building as the plaintiffs unit, but they searched the plaintiff's home
in error. The plaintiff alleged that arresting officers threw him to the
ground, handcuffed him and detained him for several hours while his
home was searched before he was transported, handcuffed to a gurney, to
the hospital. He alleged that the officer's rough handling caused him to
suffer a lip laceration that required stitches. Hospital records confirmed
that he arrived for treatment wearing handcuffs. The plaintiff was re-
leased from the hospital by the police and allowed to return home. No
narcotics or other evidence of criminal activity were discovered in his
home. He sued the City of Orlando and three individual officers, alleging
false arrest, battery, violation of his right to privacy, negligence and viola-
tion of Section 1983, including unconstitutional pat-down, search and de-
tention and use of excessive force. Plaintiff further asserted that he lived
in a house that was a duplex that had two mailboxes and two electric me-
ters, and that defendants knew or should have known that the house con-
tained two separate residences. 13 5
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (1994);Jonathan Papik, Don't Knock Them Until
We Try Them: Civil Suits as a Remedy for Knock-And-Announce Violations After Hudson
v. Michigan, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 424 (2006).
132. See, e.g., Pierre v. Neudigate, No. C-1-01-670, 101 Fed. Appx. 50, 2004
LEXIS 11150 (6th Cir. June 3, 2004); Molina v. Spanos, No. 98-4119, 1999 LEXIS
22370 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1192 (2000); Thompson v.
Mahre, 110 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1997); Todosijevic v. County of Porter, No. 2:04 CV
260, 2005 LEXIS 36753 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 2, 2005); Cacciatore v. City of Phila., No.
04-5596-04-5597, 2005 LEXIS 19064 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2005); Byrd v. Duffy, No. 96-
0070, 1998 LEXIS 19987 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1998); Martin v. Hatfield, 1994 LEXIS
18758 (E.D. Pa. 1994); McCoy v. Kummerman, No. C-91-3933-DLJ, 1993 LEXIS
2158 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16,1993); Blair v. City of Norwalk, No. H-97-005, 1998 LEXIS
438 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1998).
133. See Ajamu v. City of Orlando, No. 48-2000-CA-9770-O, 14 FLA. JURY VER-
DICr REV. & ANALYSis, Mar. 2004 (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. Nov. 6, 2003).
134. See Heard v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, Civil Action No. 00-2173-JWL (D. Kan.
Mar. 9, 2001), as reported in Vol. 16, Issue 6, NAT'LJURY VERDICT REVIEW & ANALY-
sIs (June 2001).
135. See Ajamu, No. 48-2000-CA-9770-O.
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The defendants introduced evidence that undercover officers had
purchased crack cocaine at the front of the house. When the unit that
belonged to plaintiffs neighbor was searched, firearms were found. The
defendants further contended that when a search was considered "high
risk," a pat-down was conducted to search all individuals present for
weapons.
The court directed a verdict against the City of Orlando on the false
arrest and illegal pat-down claims. The jury found for the plaintiff against
the City of Orlando on the claims of unconstitutional detention and viola-
tion of his rights of privacy and awarded him a total of $20,000, comprised
of $10,500 for past pain and suffering and $9,500 for past medical ex-
penses. The jury rejected the civil rights claims against the individual of-
ficers, and also found for the City on the claims of battery, negligence,
unconstitutional search and use of excessive force. The case settled post
verdict for $169,000.136
In Heard, the plaintiffs were asleep when the police set off a flash-bang
device and breached the door of the residence. A total of twenty officers
were involved in executing a search warrant to search for narcotics. The
husband was shot during the first eleven seconds of the raid. Neither he,
nor his wife, nor daughter was armed.13 7
The wife and daughter claimed that their civil rights were violated by
the police officers who entered their home without consent, shot the dece-
dent, and subjected them to false arrest as the decedent lay dying from the
gunshot wound the police had inflicted. The plaintiffs were held for sev-
eral hours. No narcotics nor other evidence of a crime were found in the
home or found on the plaintiffs or on the decedent's body. The plaintiffs
were not charged with any crimes. The defendant officers and the police
department denied wrongdoing, claiming that they lawfully entered the
premises to execute the warrant. The case settled prior to trial for a struc-
tured settlement of $3,500,000.138
In the knock-and-announce cases surveyed, instances of alleged law
enforcement misconduct varied from officers making what courts inter-
preted to be good-faith mistakes, to officers who attempted to perpetrate
lies, such as fabricating testimony from a nonexistent informant in order
to obtain a search warrant. The more egregious the conduct, the more
likely the plaintiff would prevail. Nevertheless, even where officers
searched the wrong residence, found no evidence of criminal activity, and
inflicted physical injury, plaintiffs did not always recover. In particular,
where there was no physical injury, plaintiffs rarely recovered. The out-
comes of these cases suggest that civil litigation is inadequate to enforce
the knock-and-announce rule. The remainder of this article discusses ex-
isting additional means for deterring police misconduct and recommends
136. See id.
137. See Heard, No. 00-2173-JWL.
138. See id.
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additional mechanisms that will more effectively redress plaintiffs' injuries
and deter officers from committing further acts of misconduct.
VIII. CURRENT MECHANISMS FOR DETERRING POLICE MISCONDUCT
A. Internal Accountability and Administrative Sanctions
In recent decades, police departments have improved their training,
supervision and oversight of officers, but there is need for further im-
provement. Effective deterrence must target officers' value systems and
the forces that motivate officers to act dishonorably. Law enforcement
agencies utilize internal accountability mechanisms to deter officers from
engaging in misconduct and to punish officers who do commit miscon-
duct. These measures include conducting random drug testing of officers,
having written standard operating procedures, utilizing a chain of com-
mand, mounting video cameras on patrol cars, requiring dispatch notifica-
tion when an officer leaves a patrol car, having citizen complaint files and
having an internal affairs division or office of professional responsibil-
ity.13 9 Although the in-department methods of preventing misconduct are
numerous, they are not always adequate.
B. External Accountability
External accountability mechanisms are the mechanisms outside the
officers' police departments that influence officers to avoid engaging in
139. See Part VII of this article, Author Survey and Analysis of Knock-and-
Announce cases; see also CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 77; Rhonda Cook and
Mike Morris, More Atlanta Cops Suspended in Fatal No-Knock Raid, THE ATLANTAJouR-
NAL-CONSTITUTION, June 28, 2007, at BI; Ken Foskett and Rhonda Cook, After
Botched Raid, Atlanta Drug Warrants Drop, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
June 11, 2007, at B I; Ken Foskett, Drug Officers Got Little Scrutiny After Abuse Claim in
'05, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, June 3, 2007, at BI; Bill Torpy and
Rhonda Cook, The KathiynJohnston Shooting, THE ATLANTAJOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
April 28, 2007, at B1. As a result of the Kathryn Johnston shooting, a civilian re-
view board has been instituted and the Atlanta Police Department is examining its
policies for the hiring, training and supervision of narcotics investigators. All of
the officers on the Atlanta Police Department's narcotics squad have been re-
placed. Kathryn Johnston was shot to death during a no-knock search. Officers
lied to obtain the warrant and planted drugs in Ms. Johnston's home after they
killed her. In April of 2007, two of the officers who executed the search pled guilty
to numerous charges, including voluntary manslaughter and perjury. In pleading
guilty, GreggJunnier admitted to having lied on other occasions in order to obtain
search warrants. A third officer who took part in the raid at Kathryn Johnston's
home has been indicted on state charges of violation of oath of office by a public
officer, false statements and false imprisonment. That third officer is contesting
those charges. On June 28, 2007, three additional police officers who were alleg-
edly involved in the raid of Johnston's home were suspended with pay pending a
federal inquiry that is ongoing. As part of their investigation, FBI agents are inter-
viewing individuals whose homes were searched by members of the team who exe-
cuted the raid at Johnston's residence to determine if misconduct was committed
during those prior searches. According to accounts in the media, during the six
months following the botched raid, Atlanta Police Department narcotics investiga-
tors have not applied for a single no-knock search warrant.
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misconduct, or that punish officers who do engage in misconduct. These
external accountability mechanisms include the threat of criminal and
civil liability and oversight from the media, citizen review boards and
elected officials. 140 Part XIII of this article provides recommendations for
additional internal and external accountability mechanisms that will assist
in more effectively preventing and punishing police misconduct.
IX. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS' MOTIVATIONS
AND MISCONDUCT
An effective deterrent must reflect the actual motivations of law en-
forcement officers. Most police officers are ends-oriented rather than
means-oriented. 14 1 They are motivated to incarcerate criminals and to re-
move narcotics, weapons and other contraband from the streets. Their
identity is bound up in protecting the public, and many believe it is per-
missible to bend the rules to preserve public safety. 142
If an officer is convinced that a suspect is factually guilty of commit-
ting an offense, but necessary elements of the legal guilt are lacking, that
officer may be tempted to "fluff up the evidence" in order to attain the
necessary probable cause to obtain an arrest or search warrant.143 Officers
who commit these types of acts are motivated by deep-seated moral beliefs.
"[M]any officers see a cruel world in which good citizens are routinely
victimized and a court system that is unresponsive, and believe they have
few alternatives than to enact their own particular brand of extralegal
justice."1 44
For an officer who follows this philosophy, a good "bust" is not neces-
sarily a bust that follows official departmental procedures and that respects
the suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure. A good bust is a bust that accomplishes the officer's
objectives: getting the narcotics, weapons, or other contraband off the
streets and obtaining evidence for a conviction: 14 5
The policeman views criminal procedure with the administrative
bias of the craftsman, a prejudice contradictory to due process of
law. That is, the policeman tends to emphasize his own expert-
ness and specialized abilities to make judgments about the mea-
sures to be applied to apprehend "criminals," as well as the ability
to estimate accurately the guilt or innocence of suspects. He sees
himself as a craftsman, at his best, a master of his trade. As such,
he feels he ought to be free to employ the techniques of his
140. See CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 77.
141. See id. at 79.
142. See SOURYAL, supra note 24, at 103.
143. See Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 68-69.
144. CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 22.
145. See Interview with anonymous police detective, Chicago Police Dep't, detective
who wishes to remain anonymous (Feb. 21, 2007).
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trade, and that the system ought to provide regulations contribut-
ing to his freedom to improvise, rather than constricting it. 146
Many police officers believe that their job is to enforce the law, not neces-
sarily to follow it. Officers who break the law in order to achieve "good"
ends are committing noble cause corruption. 1 47
Law enforcement agencies adopt codes of ethics, but some officers
believe that there is an unwritten rule that you will not report on a fellow
officer who commits misconduct.1 48 Police have to watch their backs and
their partners' backs. 14 9 It is a police officer's job to keep society under
control. Officers may rationalize that unless individuals are directly af-
fected by police behavior, they would rather not be informed of the meth-
ods that are used to combat crime. 150 We expect police to do the "dirty"
work to achieve good ends.15 1
Another way our justice system contributes to police corruption is the
use of quota systems to monitor the effectiveness of police departments. 152
Many police departments evaluate their officers' performance by measur-
ing their clearance rates or the percentage of cases they have "solved."' 5 3
A police department's clearance rate is primarily applied at the detective
level, but it is also applied to the entire department. All personnel are
pressed to compile impressive clearance rates.' 54
If a police department's clearance rate is not competitive with the
rates of other law enforcement agencies, that police department may es-
tablish a quota system to improve its statistics. Under a new quota system,
officers would be expected to issue a certain number of summonses or
conduct a certain number of field investigations during a set time pe-
riod.15 5 A police officer who must operate under a quota system will find
it difficult to be sympathetic to due process guidelines that stand in the
way of filling the required quota. 156 Arrests and seizures are rewarded
146. JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT IN DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY 196 (1971); see also Wesley, Violence and the Police, in CRIME & THE
LEGAL PROCESS, 157 (1969); Livermore, Policing, 55 MINN. L. REv. 649, 714 (1971).
147. See Michael C. Braswell, Belinda R. McCarthy, and BernardJ. McCarthy,
Justice Crime and Ethics 110 ch. 7, in POLICE ETHICS, LEGAL PROSELYTISM, AND THE
SOCIAL ORDER: PAVING THE PATH TO MISCONDUCT 110 (Victor E. Kappeler & Gary
W. Potter eds., 2005).
148. See ANTHONY B. BouzA, THE POLICE MYSTIQUE 70-71 (1990); see also CON-
NIE FLETCHER, BREAKING AND ENTERING 224-50 (1995).
149. See GINA GALLO, ARMED & DANGEROUS: MEMOIRS OF A CHICAGO POLICE-
woMAN 55-56 (2001).
150. See BOUZA, supra note 148, at 70-73.
151. See Carl Klocknars, The Dirty Harry Problem, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 428-32 (Carl Klocknars ed., 1983).
152. See CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 10; see also Quick, supra note 29,
at 31-32.
153. See Quick, supra note 29, at 30-31.
154. SeeJ. GRIFFIN, STATISTICS ESSENTIAL FOR POLICE EFFICIENCY 69 (1958).
155. See Quick, supra note 29, at 31.
156. See id. at 31.
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with favorable statistics, and earning such favorable numbers can lead to
bonuses and promotions. 157 In addition, some police departments pay
their officers overtime if the officers appear in court. Officers have been
caught after they falsified reports, listing fellow officers who had no in-
volvement in their cases as witnesses. Those colleagues testified in court,
thereby bolstering the "evidence" against the suspects whose crimes they
had "witnessed." At the same time these fake witnesses were committing
perjury, they were also lining their own pockets with extra income from
the overtime pay. 158
This ends-oriented attitude of rewarding officers who get "results" in
the form of seizures and arrests and in overtime pay for court appearances
is fed by high recidivism rates. Law enforcement officers see the justice
system as a revolving door and develop a cynical attitude about their role
in it. Officers are aware that most offenders who are arrested, prosecuted,
convicted and serve time behind bars will later commit other crimes. In
some states such as California, recidivism rates are in excess of 60%.159 To
these officers, whether the search or arrest leads to a conviction may seem
immaterial. They believe their duty is to haul in as many perpetrators as
they can and seize as much contraband as they can, by whatever means
necessary.
X. INADEQUATE POLICE TRAINING ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Inadequate law enforcement training in criminal procedure contrib-
utes to police misconduct. In some police departments, assignment to a
training unit is viewed as a punishment. 16 0 "Most 240-hour programs con-
tain at most 30 hours of law-related material. " I 6 1 In that small portion of
training that is related to the law, the majority of the instruction focuses
on substantive areas of the law, such as the definition of criminal acts,
rather than procedure. 162 In departments where recruits are given a bet-
ter grounding in criminal procedure, the training may fail to have an in-
fluence on improving officer compliance with rules that are designed to
protect individuals' constitutional rights. This failure can be attributed to
157. See ARTHUR NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN
SOCIETV 53 (1969).
158. See SOURYAL, supra note 24, at 237 (citing HeraldLink, July 29, 1997).
159. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2200 (2006) (citing CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 37 (Apr. 2001)) (explaining that 68% of
adult parolees are returned to prison, 55% for parole violation, 13% for commis-
sion of new felony offense).
160. See SLOBOCIN, supra note 107, at 15 (citing REPORT ON THE BOSTON PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT, MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE 70-83 (Jan. 14, 1992)).
161. Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and
Inadequate, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 461, 464 (1978).
162. See id. at 464; see also Quick, supra note 29, at 29; POLICE TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE STUDY, 178-79 (N.Y. City Police Dep't 1970) (Report by the N.Y. City
Police Dep't).
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the way in which legal rulings are communicated. Instructors often omit
discussing the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's and other courts'
decisions. 163 Furthermore, "[t]he spirit and tone of communication
about the law, particularly when the law is favorable to defendant's rights,
is often negative, which the need for compliance stressed only infre-
quently . . .many training materials engage in 'negative advocacy,' with
stress placed on how to 'live with'-if not avoid-Supreme Court stan-
dards."'164 In addition, if an instructor shares war stories about officers
who caught criminals or gathered evidence by breaking rules, those stories
convey the message that rules can be flouted.
XI. POLICE PERJURY
After they graduate from the Academy, officers in their probationary
period are assigned to training officers who monitor their work. 165 They
know they can be fired for failing to satisfy their training officers' expecta-
tions or demands. Therefore, they are reluctant to report a training of-
ficer who commits misconduct because of fears of reprisal.'
66
Rookie officers are sometimes counseled by their training officers to
forget everything that they learned at the Academy, including their legal
training. The training officer may advise the new officer that everyone
lies: witnesses, suspects, crime victims, cops, prosecutors, defense attorneys
and the media. 16 7 Criminals will lie to avoid getting arrested, to circum-
vent the police from gathering evidence of their culpability, to avoid con-
fessing and to avoid getting convicted of their crimes. 168 To combat this
devious behavior, some officers believe that there are instances where it is
not wrong for them to lie. 169 They become frustrated with the inefficien-
cies of the justice system and justify lies as necessary to ensure that
criminals do not get off on "technicalities.' 170 These officers fail to recog-
nize or choose to ignore the knowledge that such behavior threatens civil
liberties and that officers who commit perjury are committing a crime that
could be considered as improper as the criminal behavior of the ac-
cused.1 71 Lies told in the guise of furthering police objectives take place
both on the streets and in the courtroom. It is not uncommon for police
163. See Wasby, supra note 161, at 466.
164. Id.
165. See FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 19; see also Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Blue Coat
Crime, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 343-48 (Carl B. Klock-
ars ed., 1983).
166. See CRANK & CALDERO, supra note 22, at 62.
167. See Gallo, supra note 149, at 56.
168. See ELLEN KIRSCHMAN, I LOVE A CoP: WHAT POLICE FAMILIES NEED TO
KNow 22 (1997).
169. See Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 61, 62-67.
170. Id. at 69.
171. See id.
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officers to exchange banter about "testilying" before they testify in
court.1
72
XII. PERJURY AND PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
Some prosecutors turn a blind eye towards law enforcement miscon-
duct; other prosecutors are complicit or even coach law enforcement of-
ficers on how to circumvent the law. They may instruct law enforcement
officers to tweak their in-court testimony to deflect defense allegations of a
Fourth Amendment violation. 173 Police officers who are surveyed about
their opinions of their fellow officers' in-court testimony have reported
that they do believe that law enforcement officers lie in court.174 And
corruption investigations have revealed many prosecutors knowingly have
allowed officers to submit false testimony. One study revealed:
Sixty-one percent [of prosecutors], including 50% of state's attor-
neys, believed that prosecutors knew, or had reason to know,
more than 50% of the time when police fabricated evidence in
case reports .... Fifty percent of those responding, however, be-
lieve prosecutors know that police fabricated evidence in search
warrants most, or all, of the time that such fabrications occur. 175
Furthermore, if an officer is caught committing perjury, not only can the
officer be prosecuted for obstruction of justice and other charges, but
also, all of the officer's testimony in that case will be discredited.' 7 6 Prose-
cutors are obviously aware of this risk, but some wish to continue to have a
good relationship with police officers and are going along with the of-
ficers' schemes because they wish to avoid conflict. Other prosecutors
agree with the police that securing a conviction justifies perjury.17 7
Law enforcement officers and prosecutors who assert that such "noble
cause" corruption is not wrong are conveniently forgetting or deliberately
ignoring the risk to potentially innocent suspects and the fundamental
rights of all accused that both police and prosecutors are sworn to protect.
As evidenced by the analysis of knock-and-announce violation cases, inno-
cent individuals have been hurt and even killed as a result of law enforce-
ment officers fabricating evidence in order to obtain search warrants or
committing other varieties of misconduct. Remedies currently available to
address these injuries are inadequate. The remainder of this article rec-
172. Author's personal knowledge of law enforcement officer's behavior; see
also Slobogin, supra, note 2 at 1037, 1040 n.l1.
173. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclu-
sionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 110 (1992).
174. See Barker & Carter, supra note 2, at 68.
175. Orfield, supra note 173, at 110.
176. See CARMINE J. Mo-rro & DALE L. JUNE, UNDERCOVER 131-32 (2d ed.
2000).
177. See Slobogin, supra note 2, at 1046-47.
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ommends mechanisms that will more effectively prevent and punish po-
lice misconduct.
XIII. PREVENTING AND REMEDYING POLICE MISCONDUCT:
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
A. Stress Management Programs and Improved Law Enforcement Training
Internal law enforcement accountability mechanisms must be proac-
tive as well as reactive. 178 Supervisors, training officers, instructors and
other administrators need to be alert for signs that an officer is depressed,
is disillusioned with the job, or is having other job-related or personal
problems.
Those who study suicide say that in the nation as a whole, police
commit suicide at a far higher rate than the rest of the popula-
tion-roughly twenty-nine cops out of a thousand commit sui-
cide compared to the general population's eleven suicides out of
a thousand. 179
Stress, whether it is a product of the job, a product of the officer's home
life, or an outgrowth of some other issue, can increase the likelihood that
an officer will engage in misconduct:
Cops work in bureaucracies, and these bureaucracies create
stress that far exceeds the stress they experience in the line of
duty. Danger is not an everyday occurrence for most cops, but
organizational stress and office politics are. Cops are taught how
to deal with danger as though it happens every day, but rarely, if
ever, are they taught to anticipate-and, in turn to manage-the
daily grind of a bureaucratic system.180
Ideally, law enforcement agencies should have peer support programs and
counselors to provide advice and treat officers before stress leads them to
harm themselves or others. To insure that the maximum number of of-
ficers who need help take advantage of the programs, the professional
counselors, such as psychologists, should observe patient confidentiality.
Peer counseling is never confidential, but officers may be more willing to
confide in a fellow officer than a mental health professional, even if they
know their communications can be shared with supervisors.18 1
If participation in counseling is mandatory, the counseling will nct be
confidential, even if it is conducted by a mental health professional, such
as when counseling is part of a fitness-for-duty evaluation. 182 Psychologists
who treat officers in fitness-for-duty evaluations or in other contexts, such
178. See CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 275.
179. FLETCHER, supra note 148, at 224.
180. KIRSCHMAN, supra note 168, at 53.
181. See id. at 186.
182. See id. at 184-85.
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as when counseling is offered in lieu of firing, should require the officers
in their care to sign agreements that state they understand that records of
the therapy will be turned over to the department. 18 3
In addition to offering counseling programs, departments can incor-
porate stress management skills into training programs, both at Police
Academies and at in-services. Another way that departments can proac-
tively address the problem of potential misconduct is to involve the depart-
ment's internal affairs or professional responsibility department with
officer training, rather than just using members of those units as investiga-
tors of alleged corruption.1 8 4 "An ethically proactive unit meets with vari-
ous units, carries out in-service training, and provides officers with
discussions and examples of complex corruption cases."1 85
Law enforcement officers must be better educated about the conse-
quences of committing misconduct, and utilizing members of the internal
affairs unit or the office of professional responsibility as educators can fa-
cilitate this objective. If an officer violates an individual's constitutional
rights, the officer must realize the potential for civil liability, criminal lia-
bility and administrative sanctions, including potential job loss. The of-
ficer is also exposing fellow officers, their supervisors and employer to
potential liability. Furthermore, an officer who commits a bad act in the
aim of "doing her duty" cannot guarantee that her actions will have a posi-
tive outcome. As the study of failure to knock-and-announce cases demon-
strates, officers who perform unreasonable searches or engage in other
forms of misconduct are injuring the innocent as well as the guilty.
Improved police academy training and in-service training on criminal
procedure and ethics would educate officers about these issues. Improved
training would also foster a renewed respect for citizens' rights of privacy.
Officials who design these enhanced training programs and the training
instructors should start with the premise that law enforcement officers are
ethical. They have an ingrained sense of duty and a desire to serve justice.
Rather than focusing on the mere memorization of rules, training
should appeal to officers' inherent value systems by incorporating prob-
lem-solving situations that address real-life situations.' 86 These practical
applications will enable the officer to put rules into practice and better
prepare both rookies and veteran officers to make judgment calls that co-
incide, not conflict, with the law and departmental policies. Training
should also incorporate the rationale behind the Supreme Court's and
other courts' holdings and the rationale behind the protections afforded
by the Constitution. Training that fails to give officers a better under-
standing of why judges decide that rules should be followed will fail to
appeal to officers' sense of ethics.
183. See id. at 185.
184. See CALDERO & CRANK, supra note 22, at 275.
185. Id. at 276.
186. See id. at 272.
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In order to better reinforce the benefits of training programs once
officers reach the field, agencies must exercise greater oversight in the
selection of training officers who oversee rookie officers during their pro-
bationary period. Training officers play an important role in indoctrinat-
ing rookie officers into the culture of their law enforcement agency and in
shaping rookies' value systems. If a training officer has a cynical attitude
about departmental regulations, or about rules mandated by the Constitu-
tion or the common law, that attitude will be adopted by the rookie.
It takes only a few disappointments for an idealistic young officer
to build a self-protective wall of cynicism against being made to
look foolish or feel naive. There is so much cynicism in police
work that the cynical officer easily finds like-minded company to
reinforce his or her position.1 8 7
Cynicism is corrosive. It can lead officers to lose empathy for those they
have sworn to protect.
B. De-emphasize the Use of Quota Systems
Just as unfavorable influences from peers can contribute to cynicism
and dissolution with the job, so can quota systems. Less emphasis should
be placed on meeting quotas for issuing summons, conducting arrests and
searches and seizing specific quantities of narcotics, contraband or other
evidence of crimes. Rather than contributing to a department's effective-
ness, quota systems can be destructive to the individual officers and detri-
mental to the department. Quota systems are often perceived by officers
as unfair and arbitrarily enforced. They encourage officers to falsify evi-
dence in order to "make up the numbers."188
C. Administrative Sanctions
Every law enforcement agency should implement a written discipline
matrix. A discipline matrix specifies the range of disciplinary sanctions
that will be imposed for particular kinds of misconduct. The goals of a
written discipline matrix are: communicating the values of the particular
police department, ensuring accountability by specifying minimum disci-
pline, ensuring consistent, fair, and appropriate discipline and ensuring
accountability for command officers and other supervisors.18 9
Respecting principles of due process requires the department to pro-
vide each officer with notice of the rules and the opportunity to be heard
if the officer is alleged to have violated the rules. Communicating the
rules and the rationale behind those rules also serves to communicate the
187. KRSCHMAN, supra note 168, at 22.
188. See Quick, supra note 29, at 31.
189. See Samuel Walker, The Discipline Matrix: An Effective Accountability Tool?,
BEST PRACTICES IN POLICING CONFERENCE REPORT 4-6 (Police Professionalism Initia-
tive University of Nebraska at Omaha, Jan. 2003).
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values of the agency. "All organizations inherently resist change, and com-
prehensive improvements involve transforming the culture of the organi-
zation."1 90 Without information about these values, officers are more
likely to see the discipline matrix as just another set of regulations that are
designed to make their lives miserable. But if lines of communication
about the department's system of administrative sanctions are kept open,
and the policies in the discipline matrix are enforced fairly and equally all
through the ranks, it is much more likely to be perceived in a positive
light, and to be an effective deterrent against police misconduct. In addi-
tion, supervision and training policies should be modified if they do not
coincide with the law enforcement agency's desired values.
Providing information about the discipline matrix can enhance the
department's image with the public. Some people, particularly members
of ethnic or racial minority communities, believe that officer misconduct
is never punished. If the community learns that the department does in
fact have an official written policy dictating what appropriate officer con-
duct is, and what the sanctions are for misconduct, that can serve to re-
store trust in the police. Trust will be raised even further if the
municipality acknowledges instances of officer misconduct and does in
fact sanction those officers who break departmental violations. In addi-
tion, if an officer breaks the law, the municipality should cooperate with
the outside agency that conducts an investigation into the misconduct and
should also cooperate with prosecutors.
D. Courts Should Use Their Well-Established Power to Dictate Who Is Allowed
to Execute Warrants
It is a well-established principle that a court has the inherent power to
supervise the manner in which the court's own writs and warrants are exe-
cuted. If a law enforcement officer has committed misconduct in the con-
text of executing a warrant, under the common law the court that issued
the warrant can punish the officer by contempt or other sanction. 191 "The
power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts."192 Under 18
U.S.C.A. § 2234, an officer who in executing a search warrant "willfully
exceeds his authority or exercises it with unnecessary severity" can be fined
or imprisoned for not more than one year. 19 3
190. Samuel Walker, Report of the Conference on Police Pattern or Practice Litiga-
tion: A 10-Year Assessment, BEST PRACTICES IN POLICING CONFERENCE REPORT 3 (Po-
lice Professionalism Initiative University of Nebraska at Omaha, Mar. 2005).
191. See, e.g., State v. Sherrick, 98 Ariz, 46, 58 (1965); State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96,
99 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 423 (1963); State v.
Frye, 58 Ariz. 409 (1942), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 423
(1963); see also Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1991).
192. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citing Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510
(1874)).
193. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2234 (2002); see, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 144 F.
Supp. 669, 670-71 (D.D.C. 1956) (referencing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2234).
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In addition, an officer who commits misconduct can lose his license
to work in law enforcement in the state where the misconduct oc-
curred. 1 94 These licenses, also known as certificates, are issued by the
Peace Officer Standards Training Commissions. 19 5 Before the officer's li-
cense or certificate to work in law enforcement can be revoked, the officer
must be assigned counsel and afforded a hearing. 196 The definition of
what constitutes misconduct so egregious that revocation of a license is
warranted varies from state to state. 197
Although Peace Officer Standards Training Commissions have the
power to revoke officers' licenses to work in law enforcement, that does
not foreclose courts from also using their inherent powers to sanction of-
ficers who commit misconduct. The Supreme Court's cases and other
precedents "have indicated that the inherent power of a court can be in-
voked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct." 198
Police departments cannot be relied upon to enforce Fourth Amend-
ment principles by themselves . Although the exclusionary rule was de-
signed to deter law enforcement misconduct, it has been proven
ineffective. This author's recommended approach is directly focused on
what should be of the greatest concern: if a law enforcement officer has
shown that he commits misconduct in the context of executing a search
warrant, the court can refuse to authorize that officer to execute search
warrants in the future unless the officer is later found to be fit for duty. As
shall be discussed below, prosecutors are ethically and legally obligated to
report misconduct to the court.
Once the court is informed that a law enforcement officer may have
committed misconduct, an investigation should be conducted by the of-
ficer's employer and by independent outside agencies, if appropriate. For
instance, if a citizen alleges that a police officer committed a civil rights
violation, the matter can be referred to the Department ofJustice, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation can conduct an investigation of the allega-
tions.' 99 The court could also refer the matter for investigation by the
194. Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers'Licenses and
Federal Criminal Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 121, 122 (2003); Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police
Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. Louis U. LJ. 541,
542 (2001).
195. See Goldman, supra note 194, at 121; see also Rachel Kane & Anne M.
Payne, Sheriffs, Police, and Constables Eligibility and Qualification, 70 AM. JUR. 2D § 7
(2007).
196. See Goldman, supra note 194, at 122 (stating that hearings are conducted
by either administrative judge or held before Peace Office Standards Training
Commission and must comport with due process protections); see also Schwenke v.
State, 960 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
197. See Goldman, supra note 194, at 122-23.
198. Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).
199. See UNITED STATES ATroRNEY's MANUAL, 9-27.00 Principles of Federal
Prosecution, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/
title9/title9.htm.
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United States Attorney or district attorney, as courts sometimes proceed
with instances of perjury or criminal contempt.
The officer's actions should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, using
a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. 20 0 Some of the factors that should
be considered are whether the officer acted in good or bad faith, the se-
verity of the misconduct, the result of the misconduct, whether this was
the first instance of the officer committing a knock-and-announce viola-
tion and whether the officer has committed misconduct in another
context.
Any officer who commits a knock-and-announce violation should be
required to undergo mandatory retraining in criminal procedure and eth-
ics. Other measures designed to prevent future misconduct, such as anger
management therapy or psychological counseling, should be considered
on an as-needed basis. After these rehabilitative measures are complete,
the law enforcement agency should be in a better position to assess
whether the officer is now, or may later become, fit for duty. During the
investigation, depending upon the severity of the allegations and the evi-
dence to support them, the officer should be placed on limited duty or
suspended.
Once the investigation is complete, a report should be prepared for
the court. If the officer was cleared of the allegations, he can resume reg-
ular duty. If he was not cleared of the allegations, the municipality should
take appropriate action, according to the municipality's internal discipline
matrix and the law. The court should be the ultimate arbiter of whether
the officer will be authorized to resume executing search warrants issued
by the court.
An analogy can be drawn to another situation where officers who are
not fit for duty are no longer permitted to perform law enforcement func-
tions. Under a 1996 amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968, individ-
uals who have been convicted in any court of misdemeanor domestic
violence charges cannot ship or transport in interstate or foreign com-
merce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearms or ammuni-
tion.20 1 This law is retroactive. 20 2 The legislation has had a significant
impact on law enforcement agencies.
Police departments that had previously ignored complaints about
their officers committing domestic battery were prompted to improve
their officer counseling programs and to cease ignoring complaints from
officers' spouses who said they were being battered. These positive
changes occurred because an individual who cannot carry a firearm can-
200. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (describing impor-
tance of individualized factual analysis).
201. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 925(a) (1), 922(g) (9); see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying § 9 22(g)( 9 ) to police
officers).
202. See KIRSCHMAN, supra note 168, at 153; see also Fraternal Order of Police, 981
F. Supp. at 1.
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not work in law enforcement. 20 3 If courts were to use their power to ban
unfit officers from executing search warrants it would provide a much
stronger incentive for police departments and other law enforcement
agencies to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule and to respect sus-
pects' privacy rights. This would have the direct effect of preventing law
enforcement misconduct.
E. Prosecutors' and Defense Attorneys' Obligations to Report Police Misconduct
Defense attorneys are supposed to be advocates for their clients. Pros-
ecutors, on the other hand, are supposed to represent society as advocates
forjustice. 20 4 But too often, prosecutors become focused solely on attain-
ing convictions. Researchers who have studied why prosecutors lie or why
they coach law enforcement officers to commit perjury have found that
prosecutors share some of the same motivations as police officers who
commit misconduct. "Some prosecutors lied out of personal ambition,
some out of a zeal to protect society, but most lied because they had got-
ten caught up in the competition to win." 20 5 This fixation on obtaining
"wins" is fed by the fact that many government agencies that employ prose-
cutors, on both the state and the federal level, measure their prosecutors'
effectiveness by the percentage of cases filed that lead to convictions.
As fiduciaries of the public trust, prosecutors have higher ethical obli-
gations than other attorneys. 20 6 Under ABA Model Rule 3.8(d), prosecu-
tors must disclose "all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense" in a
timely fashion. 20 7 Furthermore, additional obligations are imposed by the
ABA's Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution Function, such as
Standard 3-1.2(c) which states, "The duty of the prosecutor is to seek jus-
tice, not merely to convict."20 8
Even more pertinent in addressing the issue of law enforcement mis-
conduct, Standard 3-3.1 (a) dictates that the prosecutor "has an affirmative
responsibility to investigate suspected illegal activities when it is not ade-
quately dealt with by other agencies." 20 9 Furthermore, under Standard 3-
3.1(c), prosecutors must not "knowingly . . . use illegal means to obtain
evidence or to employ or instruct or encourage others to use such
means." 2 10 This provision clearly addresses situations where prosecutors
coach police to commit misconduct such as "fluffing up the evidence" in
203. See Kirschman, supra note 168, at 153.
204. See R. MICHAEL CASSIDY, PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 2 (2005).
205. See SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 52-53 (1981).
206. See id. at 9-10.
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006).
208. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-1.2(c) (2007).
209. Id. at 3-3.1(a).
210. Id. at 3-3.1(c).
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order to gather sufficient probable cause for a search warrant.2 11 In addi-
tion, ABA Standards 3-3.11(a) and (c) instruct that prosecutors should
promptly disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, and forbid prose-
cutors from intentionally avoiding "pursuit of evidence because he or she
believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused." 2 12
The prosecutor has an additional obligation to report misconduct
that has occurred or that may occur under ABA Standards 3-1.5(a), which
provides,
Where a prosecutor knows that another person associated with
the prosecutor's office is engaged in action, intends to act or ref-
uses to act in a manner that is a violation of a legal obligation to
the prosecutor's office or a violation of the law, the prosecutor
should follow the policies of the prosecutor's office .... 213
Standard 3-1.5(b) imposes an affirmative reporting duty on the
prosecutor.
If, despite the prosecutor's efforts in accordance with section (a),
the chief prosecutor insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of the law, the prosecutor may take further re-
medial action, including revealing the information necessary to remedy
this violation to other appropriate governmental officials not in the prose-
cutor's office.2 14
In addition to the above obligations, prosecutors have further obligations
to disclose misconduct under the National Prosecution Standards 25.4,
"The prosecutor should disclose the existence or nature of exculpatory
evidence pertinent to the defense," 215 and through the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
and Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel. Furthermore, the
holdings in Brady v. Maryland,2 16 Kyles v. Whitley,2 17 United States v. Bag-
!ey218 and People v. Benard2 19 discuss the importance of prosecutors' duties
to disclose material favorable evidence to the defense.
Although defense attorneys do not have to observe all of the ethical
obligations imposed on prosecutors, defense attorneys are also obligated
to report misconduct to the courts.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 3-3.11(a) and (c).
213. Id. at 3-1.5(a).
214. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 3-1.5(b) (2007) (emphasis added).
215. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 25.4 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 2d ed.
1997).
216. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
217. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
218. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
219. People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1994).
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All attorneys are prohibited from "knowingly mak[ing] a false state-
ment of material fact or law to a tribunal."220 Furthermore, under the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney shall not "falsify
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an induce-
ment to a witness that is prohibited by law."221 And all attorneys shall not
"fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assist-
ing a criminal or fraudulent act by a client. '222
Similarly, in the context of civil litigation, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois has held that an attorney's failure to report another attorney's mis-
conduct may warrant suspension from practice.223 The above cases and
regulations support holding prosecutors to the affirmative duty to disclose
law enforcement misconduct to the courts, and to defense counsel. If a
prosecutor fails to observe these duties, the prosecutor can be sanctioned.
In the past, one of the perhaps unintended effects of the exclusionary
rule was to offer a convenient solution to the prosecutor's ethical di-
lemma. As long as defense counsel was aware that law enforcement of-
ficers had violated the defendant's rights, the prosecutor in practice might
have relied upon defense counsel to enforce the knock-and-announce rule
by seeking to exclude the evidence at trial. Under the Hudson decision,
illegally obtained evidence will likely be admitted, placing the prosecutor
in an ethical conflict. Unless the prosecutor acts to remedy the police
misconduct, the prosecutor is arguably complicit in their misconduct,
could perpetuate the injury to the person whose rights were violated and
may encourage officers to commit future acts of misconduct.
Reporting the misconduct to the court that issued the search warrant
is the most direct and obvious means for a prosecutor to satisfy her ethical
obligation. The court can use its inherent power to sanction the rogue
officers who conducted the illegal search and prohibit them from execut-
ing warrants in the future. The prosecutor can use the evidence to obtain
a just criminal conviction, and future acts of police misconduct will be
deterred.
XlV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan is an opportu-
nity to re-examine the sanctions and remedies for enforcing the knock-
and-announce rule. The courts and law enforcement agencies should take
advantage of this opportunity to adopt a new approach that addresses di-
rectly the offending conduct and prevents its recurrence.
220. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2007).
221. Id. at 3.4(b).
222. Id. at 4.1(b).
223. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Ill. 1988) (suspending attorney for
failure to report misconduct of another attorney).
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